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I. INTRODUCTION
The state has a strong interest in preventing harm to its citizens. 
Simultaneously, however, it must take its citizens’ liberty and autonomy
seriously as well.  Although it may ask citizens to suffer small deprivations
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in the name of enhanced security for all, as it does when we go through 
security at the airport, the state cannot engage in substantial liberty 
deprivations that violate rights.1  A state cannot deprive an individual of
his liberty for the good of others anymore than it can take a citizen’s 
property without fair compensation. 
It has commonly been thought that the primary avenue for substantial 
liberty deprivations is the criminal law.  Here, when the state acts, its
conduct is justified by the offender’s desert.  The criminal law thus respects
the autonomy and liberty interests of citizens.  Some theorists have 
argued that the criminal law is the only autonomy-respecting mechanism
for depriving rational agents of substantial liberty.2  However, in Beyond 
Crime and Commitment, I argued that the state is also justified in engaging 
in substantial liberty deprivations to prevent an actor from committing a 
criminal act when the actor has become liable to preventive intervention.3 
As I argued, prior to punishment, the state has grounds for preventive 
interference when an individual has decided to risk or cause unjustifiable 
harm to others and has performed any act in furtherance of that intention.4 
The reason why the state may intervene is because the actor is liable to 
this interference.  Because the actor has formed an intention that he
ought not to have formed, and because the actor has then acted on that
intention, the actor has forfeited his right against the state’s action designed 
to stop the actor from proceeding with the planned criminal act.  Depending 
on the case, intervention may range from electronic monitoring and curfews 
to detention. 
Liability-based prevention intervention is based upon the same moral
principle that underlies justified acts of self-defense.  When a culpable 
aggressor tries to harm an innocent victim, the victim is permitted to
1. For a defense of the autonomy-respecting view, see Alec Walen, A Unified
Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 
70 MD. L. REV. 871, 873, 877 (2011), where he “argue[s] instead that an individual may
not be deprived of his liberty unless the reasons for doing so respect his status as an
autonomous person”—by which he means “a person who has reached a threshold
capacity to use practical reason to frame and pursue a conception of a good life.”  For a 
survey of types of preventive measures and their rationales, see generally Adam Klein &
Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. (2011), http://www.harvardnsj.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Vol.-2_Klein-
Wittes_Final-Published-Version.pdf.
2. See Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 58 (2004) (“We cannot detain [dangerous people] unless they
deserve it and desert requires wrongdoing.  In the interest of liberty, we leave potentially
dangerous people free to pursue their projects until they actually offend, even if their
future wrongdoing is quite certain.  Indeed, we are willing to take great risks in the name 
of liberty.”).
3. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty 
Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
4. Id.
1274
FERZAN POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINT (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2011 10:05 AM        
  


















     
 
 
   





[VOL. 48:  1273, 2011] Inchoate Crimes 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
stop the aggressor because the aggressor has forfeited her right against
such preventive actions.5  Thus, the victim does not wrong the aggressor 
when the victim harms the aggressor in an effort to thwart the attack. 
The problem is that my argument—that the state may preventively 
intervene when an actor has formed an intention and taken any act in
furtherance of it—looks suspiciously like inchoate offenses.  Hence,
even if the underlying theory for preventive interference is sound, the 
question is why the criminal law ought to surrender this territory to an
alternative regime.  In this Article, I argue that inchoate crimes are best
dealt with under a preventive regime.  Part II argues that inchoate crimes 
and preparatory offenses are primarily aimed at preventing a harm and
not at punishing those who deserve it.  It also revisits concerns with
punishing incomplete attempts that Larry Alexander and I have voiced 
previously. Part III considers Alec Walen’s recent proposal to combat
terrorism through the criminalization of threats as an inchoate offense.  It 
also addresses general concerns with Walen’s proposal and claims that
Walen does not resolve the problems with inchoate criminality set forth 
in Part II.  Part IV addresses how to choose between the regimes if both 
are normatively justifiable.  It argues that there is no “right to be punished”
that favors punishment, nor is there any reason in principle that
procedural and legality guarantees could not be extended to a preventive 
regime.  Part IV also argues that a prevention regime can survive against 
the objections raised against punishment because it can be responsive to
concerns about intentions’ conditionality, duration, and renunciation in a 
way the criminal law cannot.  Finally, Part IV turns to proportionality
measures and argues that prevention is clearly superior to punishment if 
we truly wish to intervene and detain individuals to prevent them from 
harming us. 
II. INCHOATE CRIMES’ PREVENTION-BASED RATIONALE6 
The state criminalizes conduct the occurrence of which it wishes to 
prevent.7  Hence, to say that any crime is about punishment or prevention 
5. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Aggression: The Moral Basis for 
Liability to Defensive Killing, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012). 
6. Portions of this Part draw from Ferzan, supra note 3.
7. See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive
Rationales and the Limits of the Criminal Law, in  PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 279, 281 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (“[E]ven the purest 
retributivists must recognize that a concomitant of the decision to declare certain conduct 
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forces a false dichotomy.  One reason to criminalize murder is simply to 
minimize the occurrence of it.  However, it is similarly confused to say 
that anything the state wishes to prevent can be done through the use of 
the criminal law.  For those theorists like me, who believe that criminal 
punishment requires desert, there must be something culpable about the 
actor’s behavior that warrants punishment, as opposed to some other 
regulatory measure.  So to retributivists, the question is whether the actor’s 
conduct is itself blameworthy, not whether it is somehow dangerous. 
The criminalization of murder prevents its occurrence, but the commission 
of murder is itself a culpable act worthy of punishment. 
It is also the case that the preventive rationale exists when a crime has
been completed.  When we incarcerate a murderer, we kill two birds with
one stone—we inflict punishment and we prevent this actor from
committing (most) additional crimes by incarcerating that actor. And in 
a world of limited resources, it is fair to say that retributive justice may 
simply be too expensive if there is not some secondary benefit that 
comes from punishment.8 
Although most punishment will therefore come with a dash, if not two 
cups, of prevention, the converse is not true.  A preventive regime that 
focuses on dangerous propensities due to age, gender, race, or genetics 
need not require the actor to do anything, much less anything blameworthy.
The airport screening system screens you not because you have done 
anything blameworthy but because it is fair to ask you to suffer this 
minimal privacy invasion in order to maintain security for all—a result 
that does benefit you.
The question is what to do with those acts that appear to lie on the 
prevention/punishment border.  Perhaps the primary battleground between 
prevention and punishment is the area occupied by inchoate crimes and
preparatory offenses.  This Part argues that these crimes are truly aimed
at prevention and are not based on blameworthiness.  Thus, if the state
were to enact the liability-based preventive regime I have proposed,
these crimes ought to be decriminalized and some ought to be reclassified
to be a serious wrong and therefore criminal is a commitment to reduce the frequency of
that conduct.”); see also  LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN WITH
STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 3, 6 (2009) 
(noting “the criminal law aims at preventing harm” and “the criminal law both creates 
and reflects value by announcing which conduct is sufficiently wrong to deserve blame 
and punishment”). 
8. See generally  DOUGLAS HUSAK, Why Punish the Deserving?, in  THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 393, 393 (2010) (arguing that “a political 
theory is required in addition to a moral theory if we hope to identify the conditions in 
addition to desert that must be satisfied in order to justify state punishment”).
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as actions for which an individual can become liable to preventive
interference.9 
A.  Attempts 
Assume that Alex thinks that one day he may want to kill Betty.  He 
has no firm intention at this point.  He buys some burglar’s tools (for 
example, a screwdriver and a crowbar), figuring that he may have some 
use for them sooner or later; perhaps the use will be illegal but perhaps 
not.  Later, he forms the intention to kill Betty.  Still later, he buys a gun.
Next, he follows her to figure out her routine.  Then, he waits outside her 
house until it is night.  Then, he uses his burglar’s tools to break in. 
Then, he goes to her bedroom.  Then, he shoots her in the head.  Under 
current law, Alex can be punished for a preparatory offense—such as 
possession of burglar’s tools, or later for attempt—at the point he buys
the gun or when he lies in wait.  And finally, of course, if the state has 
failed to intervene before the offense, the state can punish Alex for the 
completed crime.
When criminal law struggles to determine when Alex has gone beyond 
“mere preparation” and has actually “attempted” the offense, it struggles 
with two competing considerations.10  The first is the state’s interest in 
prevention.  We want the police to be able to intervene.  We want the 
police to stop Alex before it is too late.11  On the other hand, we want to
take Alex’s liberty and free will seriously.12  The common law called 
this the locus poenitentiae—the opportunity that Alex ought to have to
repent.13  Indeed, the common law did not allow for abandonment of
9. Some actions that are currently crimes ought not ground either a preventive or 
punitive response by the state. 
10. See  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 396 (5th ed. 2009)
(“A major difficulty in drawing a line between noncriminal preparation and a criminal 
attempt is that courts are torn by competing policy considerations.”). 
11. See id. (“[T]here is the understandable desire of courts and legislators to ease 
the burden on the police, whose goal it is to prevent crimes from occurring.”).
12. See id. (“[I]f courts authorize too early police intervention, innocent persons, as
well as those with still barely formed criminal intentions—persons who might voluntarily turn
back from criminal activity—may improperly or needlessly be arrested.”).
13. See King v Barker [1924] NZLR 866 (CA) 873 (noting a prior court’s 
reasoning that when the defendant has not committed the last act and “has stopped short 
of this, whether because he has repented, or because he has been prevented, or because
the time or occasion for going further has not arrived, or for any other reason, he still has 
a locus poenitentiae, and still remains within the region of innocent preparation”).
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attempts precisely because it placed the act requirement far enough 
along the continuum so as to already create room for a change of heart.14 
Although states adopt a range of actus reus formulations for attempts,
Alexander and I have argued that to deserve punishment, one must
unleash a risk of harm over which one believes one no longer has
complete control.15  Notably, this would place punishment at the far end 
of the continuum, and police intervention in a “crime” would not be 
possible at any preparatory stage. 
Why not think that merely forming an intention is itself a culpable
action warranting punishment?  To put this more crisply, the question is 
whether forming an intention or maintaining an intention is a culpable
act or omission that the state ought to punish.  There are three primary
reasons to reject punishment for the formation or retention of an intention. 
First, it is difficult to distinguish intentions from desires, wishes,
fantasies, and the like.16  When Alex has “thought” about killing 
Betty, how do we, and how does he, distinguish this thought from a firm 
intention?  Second, how should the law take account of duration and 
renunciation if forming an intention is a culpable act?17  If one changes 
one’s mind multiple times, are there more crimes?  Should it matter that 
some actors form an intention earlier than others?  Notably, if the 
formation and retention of an intention is itself a crime, then it would
seem that the answers to these questions should be yes because the actor
has “acted” multiple times by forming multiple intentions and the actor 
has “possessed” the intention for longer.  Yet, both of these answers seem 
counterintuitive because renouncing an intention, even if one returns to 
it, appears to indicate less culpability.  Moreover, because holding 
an intention itself does not increase the risk of harm to anyone as it 
continues over time, it is hard to see why possessing the intention for 
longer would aggravate the “offense.”  Thus, the problem is that neither 
alternative seems correct: if forming an intention is an act and
possessing an intention is an omission—to rid oneself of it—then our 
typical responses dictate in favor of greater culpability for greater acts 
and longer omissions.  For instance, in cases of possession, it is worse to
have a grenade for a year than to have it for a minute.  But these precepts
14. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 695 (1997) (“The common law had no
need for a renunciation defense in order to encourage potential offenders to stop short of 
the offense.  When criminal liability for an attempt attaches late in the process between 
preparation and commission, as with the common law’s proximity tests, the actor has an
incentive to stop in his planned offense because by doing so he avoids all liability.”).
15. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 7, at 197. 
16. See id. at 202. 
17. See id. at 206–07. 
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appear to be false for intentions.  So, we might wonder how we should
understand the culpability inherent in forming and holding intentions. 
Third, and most important, is the concern that intentions are
conditional in ways that affect the culpability of the actor and whether 
that actor will ultimately choose to perform the action.18  Imagine that 
you asked yourself quite seriously one day what you would do if your
spouse ever cheated on you, and you resolve, quite resolutely, that you 
would kill him.  Is that sufficient for attempted murder?  And if not, is
part of the reason why we reject this assessment because we think that 
what we will do ultimately turns on a number of conditions, some of 
which we are conscious of and some of which we are dispositionally
affected by?  The intention to have sex with that attractive woman across
the room may seem unconditional, but it may ultimately turn on the
woman’s consenting, being above age, and not having bad breath.  As 
Michael Bratman has noted, our future intentions, our plans, are partial.19 
The function of intentions is to guide future deliberation, but this means 
that we will be open to amending our plans as facts are revealed to us.
An intention to drive to the grocery store at forty miles per hour will not 
hold if one encounters a school zone, sees a car accident, or winds up in
the pouring rain. 
Centrally, the gravamen of Alexander’s and my objection is that if 
intentions are conditional—internally in ways the defendant adverts to
and externally in terms of the defendant’s dispositions—then we are 
quite hard pressed to say that the defendant will actually choose to cause 
the later harm.  Moreover, because Alexander and I believe completed 
attempts and completed crimes ought to be punished equally, we are even
more troubled at this significant punishment.  Intentions are gappy and 
conditional guides to future conduct that we reconsider and abandon.
Our practical reasoning abilities allow us to retain complete control over 
when and if these intentions will be translated into an action that risks 
harm to other people.
Although one might argue in response that attempts need an action in
addition to the intention, it is also hard to see why the act, short of 
performing an act that the defendant believes can cause harm without
18. See id. at 203–06. 
19. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASONS 28– 
29 (CSLI Publications 1999) (1987). 
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further action, affects the defendant’s culpability.20  If the reason to 
require an act is to corroborate that the intention is resolute, the act does 
not add to the defendant’s desert but serves only an evidentiary purpose. 
If the act is a proxy for dangerousness—the closer the actor is, the more
dangerous the actor is—the problem is that dangerousness and culpability
come apart.  One can be culpable without being dangerous—think of
inherently impossible attempts, such as using a voodoo doll to kill—and
one can be dangerous without being culpable—think of someone with a
severe mental illness.  Even on this view, the actor’s getting closer to 
success does not add something to desert; it merely adds to our anxiety
that the actor will succeed. 
Thus, there is substantial reason to doubt that incomplete attempts 
punish blameworthy conduct.  Rather, it seems that many inchoate offenses 
are truly pockets of prevention, not punishment.  When Alex follows 
Betty, he may still choose not to harm her at all.  As Stephen Morse
has noted, “[E]xcept for the criminalization of ‘last-act’ cases, inchoate
criminality is largely preemptive, rather than a response to behavior
that itself risks harming others.”21  Indeed, as Morse notes, the clearest
evidence that most of attempt law is preventive is the abandonment 
defense.  In no other area of criminal law can the defendant simply
“erase” the criminal wrongdoing.22  “We permit active abandonment
because until the last act, there is always a genuine chance that the
inchoate criminal does not ‘really’ mean it.”23 
The language of cases, wherein courts decide when a defendant has 
committed a sufficient act for attempt liability, likewise reveals attempt
law’s preventive nature.  Consider State v. Reeves, wherein the court upheld 
a jury finding that the defendant was a delinquent child because she 
attempted second-degree murder.24  Tracie Reeves and her friend, Molly 
Coffman, spoke on the phone and decided to kill their middle-school 
homeroom teacher by placing rat poison in her drink.25  Coffman brought 
rat poison on the bus to school, bragged about the plan to a friend on the 
bus, and at school placed her purse next to the teacher’s coffee cup.26 
The other bus rider informed a teacher, and the school intervened at this 
20. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: 
Retribution or Prevention?, in SEEKING SECURITY: PRE-EMPTING THE COMMISSION OF 
CRIMINAL HARMS (G.R. Sullivan ed., forthcoming 2012). 
21. Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 288 
(1999). 
22. See id.
23. Id. at 289. 
24. State v. Reeves, 916 S.W.2d 909, 910, 914 (Tenn. 1996). 
25. Id. at 910. 
26. Id.
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point.27  The Tennessee court faced a question of first impression.  Early 
Tennessee precedent had required the attempt to be quite close to
completion, but Tennessee had since adopted the language of the Model
Penal Code (MPC) requiring “a substantial step.”28  Ultimately, the court 
found the girls’ conduct was sufficient for attempt.  The court’s reasoning 
was that a rigid requirement would undermine the “preventative goal of 
attempt law”29: 
The shortcomings of the [prior precedent] with respect to the goal of
prevention are particularly evident in this case. As stated above, it is likely that
under [the prior precedent] no criminal responsibility would have attached
unless the poison had actually been placed in the teacher’s cup.  This rigid
requirement, however, severely undercuts the objective of prevention because 
of the surreptitious nature of the act of poisoning.  Once a person secretly places 
a toxic substance into a container from which another person is likely to eat or
drink, the damage is done.30 
With this sort of offense, the court is not focusing on the desert of the 
defendant—what has been done—but on what the defendant might do.
The court’s goal is to set the act requirement at a point that will stop the 
defendant.  It does not discuss the defendant’s culpability and desert.  It 
focuses instead of the state’s preventive goals. 
Notably, this is not true of solicitation or conspiracy.  When one 
solicits another person to commit a crime, one has lit a metaphorical fuse.
The agent may go through with the offense even if the solicitor wishes to
call the agent off.31  Equally true, a coconspirator may harden the resolve
of compatriots, making it more likely that they will commit the crime 
with or without the coconspirator.  In both cases, the defendant has
unleashed risks that can no longer be controlled through will alone.32 
This is not true in the case of early attempts.  By a mere change of mind, 
there will be no crime.
Now, returning to Alex, there may be some culpable acts that he does 
commit along the continuum.  Carrying around a gun for no reason other
than to harm someone may create an unjustified risk of death through 
27. Id.
28. Id. at 910–13. 
29. Id. at 914. 
30. Id. 
31. For this reason, the renunciation defense is not available unless the defendant 
persuades the solicited party not to commit the offense or otherwise prevents its
commission.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(3) (1962). 
32. To have a renunciation defense to a conspiracy charge, the defendant must
thwart the conspiracy’s success.  Id. § 5.03(6). 
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accidental discharge.  And if Alex drives to the house, the risks he imposes
by driving are all unjustifiable given the reason for which he imposes 
those risks.  And when Alex points the gun at Betty, he also risks the 
gun’s accidentally going off.33  If Alex consciously disregards these 
risks, he is culpable for imposing them, too.  But these crimes are not
what are at stake here.  The question is what the grounds are for punishing 
Alex for attempting to kill Betty at some point prior to his pulling the 
trigger.34 
Certainly, the state wants to stop Alex from killing Betty.  But is the 
criminal law punishing blameworthy conduct?  Or is it looking for an 
intervention point for prevention?  That is, inchoate attempts, far from 
offering a principled desert basis, appear to side-step the issue in favor
of prevention.  But if it is a system of prevention that we want, then we 
should focus on working out the details of a preventive system. 
B.  Preparatory Offenses 
The problem of preventive goals’ being pursued through the use of 
criminal punishment goes beyond the formulation of the actus reus for
an attempt.  In efforts to reach potential criminals, legislators create
preparatory offenses.  The possession of burglar’s tools is an example of 
a preparatory offense.35  Possession of burglar’s tools is a crime,36 and 
yet at the time Alex possesses the tools, he has not formed the intention 
to use the tools illegally.  Moreover, there is nothing harmful in the 
possession of these tools.  The justifications for the law are that it allows
early police intervention and eases prosecutorial burdens, not that it 
tracks retributive desert.37  The state creates new completed offenses,
33. See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 20. 
34. There may be other possible offenses as well.  A defendant’s awareness of a
dangerous character trait may give rise to a duty to seek to change the behavior, 
particularly when the defendant will seek mitigation later for inadvertence or lack of
control.  See ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 7, at 85, 167.  Morse has 
suggested that a defendant may likewise have an obligation to take affirmative steps to 
prevent acting on a culpable intention. See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An
Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 152–54 (1996).  But see Michael
Corrado, Punishment, Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, 15 CRIM. J. ETHICS 3, 9–10
(1996) (arguing that a potential offender’s duty is not to perform the act, as opposed to
being obligated to turn himself in).
35. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of 
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 835 (2001) (“By last count, New
York law recognized no fewer than 153 possession offenses; one in every five prison or 
jail sentences handed out by New York courts in 1998 was imposed for a possession
offense.”).
36. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.35 (McKinney 1999). 
37. See Dan Bein, Preparatory Offences, 27 ISR. L. REV. 185, 201 (1993)
(“I believe there is an additional criterion, having to do with pragmatic considerations of
1282
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ultimately ignoring that they are mere preparatory steps towards the 
commission of the crime the state wishes to prevent.  As Michael Moore 
notes, 
The problem with . . . “wrongs by proxy” is that [they] give liberty a strong
kick in the teeth right at the start.  Such an argument does not even pretend that
there is any culpability or wrongdoing for which it would urge punishment; 
rather, punishment of a non-wrongful, non-culpable action is used for purely
preventive ends.38 
Paul Robinson has cautioned that the use of the criminal law for
regulatory purposes undermines its moral strength.39 Moreover, because
these offenses may include nonculpable conduct, they risk creating a 
chilling effect and deterring law-abiding citizens from engaging in
permissible activities.40 
For instance, consider State v. Ansari, wherein the defendant challenged 
the constitutionality of the crime of enticing a minor over the Internet.41 
The Utah appellate court upheld the statute’s constitutionality—a statute 
that was intended to allow intervention prior to a crime of attempt,
conspiracy, or solicitation.42  The statute does not require a substantial 
step: “If the predator is caught early in his effort, the State may charge 
Internet enticement, and if caught after the crime had developed, the
State may have evidence to charge the greater crimes of attempt,
conspiracy, and solicitation.”43  In other words, even after courts and
legislatures struggle to draw a line between preparation and an attempt, 
this line can be erased by the creation of another crime that occurs prior
to the attempt.  It is further erased when the jurisdiction punishes the 
enforcement rather than substantive considerations.  It is the need to provide the police
with the means for making preventative arrests.”).
 38. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
784 (1997). 
39. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76
B.U. L. REV. 201, 213–14 (1996). 
40. See Daniel Ohana, Responding to Acts Preparatory to the Commission of a
Crime: Criminalization or Prevention?, 25 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 28 (2006) (noting that 
criminalizing preparatory acts can have a chilling effect on socially beneficial activity).
41. State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶¶ 2–5, 100 P.3d 231, 234. 
42. See id. ¶ 6, 100 P.3d at 234–35 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-401
(LexisNexis 2003)). 
43. Id. ¶ 21, 100 P.3d at 238. 
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attempt to commit the proxy crime, producing a double inchoate offense 
even further removed from the ultimate crime.44 
Proxy crimes do not punish for blameworthy behavior.  Proxy crimes 
are purely for prevention.  As Chris Slobogin observes, “The gravamen
of these crimes is not what the person thought, but the objective risk
posed. In many cases, that risk is not very high, and in some it is
nonexistent, but the state exerts its police power anyway.”45  If we  
believe the state ought to intervene against preparatory behavior, then 
the state ought to come clean with principles of prevention that are not 
principles of punishment.46 
The preventive desire is particularly evident in the rash of crimes 
enacted in the United Kingdom in response to terrorism.  Early inchoate 
offenses, such as possession and association with enumerated organizations, 
have been criminalized not based on the blameworthiness of the actor
but on the state’s need to intervene.47  Nevertheless, because of the
profound dangerousness of actors, the penalties are stiff, including life 
imprisonment.48 
In summary, what attempt law and preparatory offenses do is to allow 
the state’s preventive regime to be concealed within the criminal law. 
Although the desert in these cases is minimal or nonexistent, the criminal 
law allows for intervention, and sometimes significant incarceration, in 
order to prevent the dangerous from committing offenses.  However, if
incomplete attempts and preparatory offenses are truly based on preventive
rationales and have little, if anything, to do with retributive desert, then 
criminal law ought to surrender this territory to a preventive regime. 
44. See Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 7, at 284–85 (arguing these extensions are 
unprincipled).  For a general analysis of this category, see Ira P. Robbins, Double
Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1989). 
 45. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 148 (2006); see also Bernadette McSherry, 
Expanding the Boundaries of Inchoate Crimes: The Growing Reliance on Preparatory 
Offences, in REGULATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE
FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW 141, 153 (Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie & Simon 
Bronitt eds., 2009) (“It is . . . probably more appropriate to see preparatory offences as a 
separate species of offences existing outside the general justifications for inchoate 
offences and developing in an ad hoc manner in response to policy concerns.”). 
46. Cf. Dubber, supra note 35, at 917–18 (noting that possession offenses indicate 
“just how anxious the modern state is to pursue its incapacitative mission, so eager in 
fact that it is willing to enlist the services of an offense that runs afoul of most, if not all, 
of the fundamental tenets of traditional American criminal law”). 
47. See Lucia Zedner, Fixing the Future? The Pre-emptive Turn in Criminal 
Justice, in REGULATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE
FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 45, at 35, 50 (“Criminalisation of activities
remote from the actual commission of an act of terrorism is justified by the need to 
furnish the legal grounds for action against individuals at the very earliest stages of
preparation.”).
48. See, e.g., Terrorism Act, (2006) § 5(3), 11(1) HALS. STAT. (4th ed.) 422. 
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III. A CASE FOR CRIMINALIZATION: WALEN ON THREATS
Whereas my view on proxy crimes is hardly controversial, my view 
that the actus reus for attempts should be placed far along the continuum
is considered less than gospel.  Because my argument is that the state
can intervene as a matter of prevention but not punishment once an
individual forms an intention and acts upon it, we should consider the 
strongest case set forth for criminal punishment at this early stage.  As a 
recent example of the case for the punishment of quite inchoate 
incomplete attempts, let us consider Alec Walen’s argument for the
broad criminalization of threats. 
A.  Walen’s Argument 
Walen and I agree that the state cannot engage in long-term preventive
detention if it does not respect the autonomy of the detainee.  Whereas I
opt for a liability-based prevention system, Walen favors a broadening of
the criminal law.  Specifically, he argues that “threatening, in the sense of
stating one’s intention to commit a [crime],” is itself an inchoate
offense.49  Walen claims that the communication of an intention can 
serve as the actus reus for threats in the same way that a substantial step
or dangerous proximity serves as the actus reus for attempts.50 
On Walen’s view, the purpose of criminalization is not to predict
future criminality but rather to punish for what the actor has already
done.51  Specifically, “[w]hat matters in forming a criminal intention is
that one has already chosen to flout the law.”52  Although Walen’s theory
could arguably support using threats as an inchoate offense for any
crime, Walen argues that it should be limited to cases such as terrorism 
and similarly significant crimes in order to strike the balance between
freedom from a police state and the need to prevent harm.53 
 49. Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How To Understand 
the Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term 
Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 804 (2011). 
50. See id. at 834–35. 
51. See id. at 840. 
52. Id.
53. Id.  Walen also unravels the rather confused jurisprudence on threats in his
piece.  His excellent argument in this regard is orthogonal to the project at hand, but it is
worth noting that despite my criticisms in the text, there is much to admire about
Walen’s overall effort. 
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B.  Assessing the General View
My first worry about Walen’s argument is his use of the formation of
the intention to “flout the law” as the culpable act.  Although I agree that 
rule of law values can be protected by the criminal law, it seems that this
does not capture the culpability that Walen wants to capture.  That is, the 
wrong of threatening terrorist activity is not the same wrong as walking 
on the grass, or speeding three minutes after passing a police car with a
radar gun, or even committing arson.  Rather, the impermissible act, on
the best interpretation of Walen’s view, should be geared not towards the 
wrong that one does to the criminal law but to the wrong that one does 
by disvaluing the lives of prospective victims.  An intention to commit 
any crime is an intention to flout the law.  What Walen wants, though, is 
the culpability of choosing to flout a particular law.  That is, I think that 
Walen needs to refine exactly what he views the culpable act to be and 
exactly why it is culpable.  Reframed, it will raise two puzzles for Walen.
First, how disrespectful or culpable is it to intend to harm someone when
one can prevent this harm through reason and will alone?  Second, and 
relatedly, how much punishment does this act deserve?  (I will return to 
this question in Part IV.) To put these points another way, flouting the
law may be complete at intention formation, but that is not the
worrisome inchoate offense of prospective terrorism that Walen believes 
he is capturing within the net of his proposed inchoate offense. 
Walen also seeks to differentiate among conditional intentions, with 
some counting as threats but others not.54  Here, too, it seems that further
work is necessary to find a principled dividing line.  As noted above, 
intentions are often conditional, both internally in ways that the actor 
acknowledges and externally in ways that the actor may not consciously
advert to but that would nevertheless cause the plan to be abandoned. 
Consider those actors who will only engage in culpable conduct if a 
condition obtains, where the condition is neither exculpatory nor inculpatory
itself but rather affects the probability that the actor will actually engage 
in the conduct.  The MPC view is that a conditional intention counts as 
an unconditional intention unless the condition negates the harm or evil
sought to be prevented.55  The MPC approach yields that Abe and Alex, 
who agree to kill their wives if they win the lottery, are guilty of
conspiracy to commit murder; that Bob who points a gun at Vickie and 
sincerely threatens, “Your money or your life,” is guilty of attempted
murder; and Walen’s example, that Carl who announces to his friend, 
54. See id. at 845. 
 55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (1962). 
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“I will blow up an American embassy if the United States invades 
Yemen,” is guilty of a criminal threat. 
Walen purports to solve the conditionality problem with the following 
standard: 
I suggest the following gets at the heart of the core distinction between
intention and fantasy: if the condition is sufficiently likely to arise that the actor
is actively or regularly watching to see if it has arisen, and if he is ready to act
on his illicit intention if the condition does arise, then he should be treated as if
he has the unconditional intention.56 
Notice the components: First, there is a requirement that the condition be
“sufficiently likely.”  Is this probability to be viewed from the actor’s 
perspective? The actor may think an event highly likely that will not 
occur, or think one unlikely that will.  Risk depends on perspective. 
Second, there is a desire-state component—the question of whether the 
defendant is watching and preparing to act on it.  These two components
can come apart.  Indeed, in our first piece on this issue, Alexander and I
noted the complexities of focusing on probabilities and on desire states.57 
Abe and Alex may hope and desire that they hit the lottery but estimate the
chances as very low.  Bob, on the other hand, may estimate the chances to 
be quite high that Vickie will not comply, yet very much hope that she 
will.  Carl may also strongly desire the condition not obtain, although he 
is prepared for the possibility that it will.58  One may hope and act in
furtherance of a low probability event, such as winning the lottery, or
dread a high probability event, such as a robbery victim’s standing her
ground.  Walen fails to specify which condition makes the difference, 
particularly when they diverge.  Nor does he justify precisely why we would
need both.  Is the person who plans in favor of a low probability event not
 56. Walen, supra note 49, at 846. 
57. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1143–44 (1997). 
58. We also worried that although internally conditional intentions appear
distinguishable from externally conditional ones, this is not the case.  What are we to say
about the respective culpabilities of the actors above when compared with David and
Don, who conspire to kill their wives tomorrow; Edgar, who intends to kill Vera after
she hands over the money; and Fred, who views all U.S. actions as grounds for engaging
in acts of terrorism?  Alexander and I presented the concern that although the first group
appears less culpable than the second group, it is also the case that the second group
would desist if certain conditions obtained, despite the fact that they did not consciously
advert to them, and thus, both groups are equally capable of renouncing their criminal 
intentions.  See id.
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culpable for flouting the law in Walen’s opinion, or is the person just not 
sufficiently dangerous for the law to worry about? 
C.  Does Walen Solve the Problems with Inchoate Criminality? 
In defending his approach, Walen specifically takes on the arguments
that Alexander and I have presented against inchoate criminality, arguing 
that each objection is surmountable.59  Let us turn to Walen’s proposed
solutions to the problems Alexander and I have raised.
With respect to distinguishing intentions from desires and fantasies, 
Walen states that the evidence will sometimes meet this burden by
looking to “the sincerity with which the message is communicated,
whether it is repeated, the context in which it is said, and the person’s 
general character.”60  The problem, however, is not that we cannot always
separate intentions from fantasies—after all, my intention to go to the 
store this Saturday to buy groceries is hardly a fantasy, nor is it merely a 
nightmare.  The problem is exactly how to patrol their border when even 
the agent may not know which one it is. If Walen wants to punish threats 
but not articulated fantasies, then there needs to be a way to confidently
distinguish them.  Moreover, Walen’s reliance on character evidence to
determine whether something is a fantasy or an intention is even more
problematic, especially in the context of terrorism and similar offenses. Are
we truly allowed to assume that a good person’s fantasy is a bad person’s
firm intention? 
Walen also purports to solve another problem with the conditionality 
of intentions.  Alexander and I have noted that the degree of culpability
of the final act will depend on the conditions that the actor adverts to at
that time.61  But earlier in the planning process the actor may not have
formed any beliefs whatsoever about these later conditions.  The later
conditions may be inculpatory—an intention to drive fifty miles per hour 
becomes criminal if it holds in the face of rainy roads and children 
crossing the street—or exculpatory—an intention to blow up a football
stadium as a protest may suddenly become justified just prior to blowing
up the stadium when the actor notices the stadium is being used by
terrorists about to detonate an offsite dirty bomb.  Walen is unwilling to 
inculpate those with seemingly unconditional intentions if they do not 
anticipate the inculpatory condition.  However, he is willing to punish 
those who form an intention to do something wrongful, arguing “[i]f she 
shows a general indifference to the lives of others, or sees some extra
 59. Walen, supra note 49, at 846–53. 
60. Id. at 847 (citing United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
61. See Alexander & Kessler, supra note 57, at 1152–53. 
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value in killing innocents, then her culpability should be high, perhaps 
nearly as high as if she intended to kill innocents.”62 But this response
fails to see the puzzle.  The puzzle is that the intention is supposedly an 
inchoate offense that leads up to the eventual offense.  And we might
presuppose that culpability should build over time.  But this simply is 
not the case.  Culpability will fluctuate over time as conditions change 
and the plan is reformulated.  Moreover, because intentions are generally
gappy and conditional, there are likely to be substantial changes over 
time.63 
As for duration, Walen denies that duration matters.64  He believes  
that all that matters is sufficient time to determine that the intention is 
sincerely and firmly held.65  But why?  Or to put the point another way,
why not maintain that whatever is culpable about forming an intention is 
also culpable about maintaining the intention?  Indeed, given that Walen
does not argue that this must actually increase the risk of harm to the
victim at all, is there not more “flouting” the longer the intention is held? 
If not, why not?  He never tells us why we should choose that duration
does not matter on his view, and he certainly does not purport to solve 
this problem for inchoate offenses generally. 
Finally, consider our concern about renunciation.  First, Walen makes 
the curious assertion that someone who vacillates only commits one 
culpable act because “what [the defendant] is doing is vacillating with 
regard to a single intention.  He does not commit a second culpable act 
when he accepts it again; he reenters the stream of his earlier culpability,
losing whatever benefit may have come to him from renunciation.”66 
I do not see why he thinks this is so.  Charitably, one might read Walen
as follows: if the defendant truly vacillates in a way that evinces that the 
defendant has not truly formed the intention yet, then it is one intention. 
But—one might fill in for Walen—it should also be the case that if one 
62. See Walen, supra note 49, at 847–48. 
 63. In Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, Larry Alexander and I also 
question why incomplete attempts merge with completed attempts and successful crimes. 
That is, if Walen believes that we should punish Carl for his early threat, but when he
later acts, he acts under circumstances in which he reasonably believes he is justified,
should these two crimes merge?  And how does one merge a culpable threat and a later 
justified action? See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics 
of Preemptive Action, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012). 
64. See Walen, supra note 49, at 849–50. 
65. Id. at 850. 
66. Id.
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forms an intention, renounces, and later reconsiders, it is also possible 
that those are two separate culpable acts.  That is, I find it implausible
that Walen truly wants the defendant to just “reenter the stream of his
earlier culpability” no matter why and when the defendant reconsiders.
If I drop a grenade (perhaps gently put down would be a better description) 
and then pick it up, and do this five times, why have I not engaged in a 
number of voluntary acts?  Not to mention that how long I hold the 
grenade may matter.  If a terrorist changes his mind but reconsiders one
year later, why would Walen think of this as one act of flouting the law? 
In summary, Walen fails to resolve the puzzles of inchoate criminality.
D.  Comparing the Views 
It bears noting that Alexander and I certainly have the ability on our 
view to criminalize threats not as inchoate offenses but as completed
offenses themselves.  To the extent that one communicates a threat and
causes or risks causing fear for no good reason, one has engaged in 
unjustifiable conduct.  Walen’s argument cleanly disentangles two different
reasons to criminalize threats: First, as completed offenses, which do not 
require sincerity but do require culpability as to causing fear.  Second, as
inchoate offenses, which are an early step in a criminal plan and which 
require sincerity but do not require one to cause fear.  Walen’s focus is
on the latter case, but the former avenue is available to Alexander and 
me.
The critical divergence between Walen’s approach and the Alexander-
Ferzan view takes place at stage one.  The question is whether the
formation of the intention is itself a culpable act worthy of the criminal
law’s concern.  Alexander and I answer no because our future choices
are subject to our will in ways that are critically important.  An individual 
may choose not to commit the crime; conditions may obtain that increase or
decrease culpability; and actors have no reason to view themselves (and 
we have no reason to view them) as anything other than rational agents 
who can see the error of their ways.  That is, to us, the critical feature of 
wanting to punish an early actor is not a significant amount of desert at t1 
but rather a desire to stop the actor from acting at t2.  But if what we 
want is prevention, not punishment, then, as I argue above, we should do
prevention and not disguise it as criminal punishment. 
The Walen view, however, takes the formation of that intention as
itself a kind of completed offense.  That is, I think there is a deep tension 
in Walen’s argument between his claim that he is creating an inchoate 
offense and the way that he treats this offense in relation to later criminality. 
Walen does not truly care what the actor does next.  The crime is complete
at t1.  To Walen, at   t1, the actor has flouted the law, has intended the 
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impermissible, and deserves punishment for that act.  Even though later
conditions may obtain that change the culpability, which Alexander and 
I but not Walen believe raise difficult issues, to Walen, a crime ends at
t1.  For this reason, Walen seems ambivalent at best about the availability of
a renunciation defense.  The crime is done. 
What becomes critically important to see is that on Walen’s view, the 
measure of proportionate punishment must then turn on the crime that 
ends at t1.  Thus, Carl should still be punished for threatening to blow up 
the American embassy if the United States invades Yemen even if he
(1) ultimately acts under circumstances that he knows are justified,
(2) ultimately changes his mind three minutes later, or (3) continues to 
deliberate about this plot for years before the plot’s culmination in the 
killing of millions of innocent people.  For Walen, later acts should neither
increase nor decrease the desert attached to the threat at t1.  I turn to the 
measure of desert below.
IV. CHOOSING BETWEEN REGIMES
One may think that my view of liability to preventive interference 
goes a long way towards criminalization.  I am willing to concede the 
state has a legitimate interest in interfering with the autonomy of the 
individual.  I am willing to concede the individual has relinquished this 
autonomy through voluntary acts.  I am relying on culpability, an ingredient 
that is central to the criminal law.  If this looks like a crime, why not call 
it a crime? Even if one is persuaded by Walen’s claim that we can 
retributively justify punishing threats, I maintain there are persuasive 
reasons to opt for a preventive regime.  To me, this question truly turns 
on proportionality concerns and how the state’s interest is related to its 
liberty-depriving response.  However, before I turn to this central claim,
I wish to clear out arguments for criminalization that I do not believe 
ultimately support preferring punishment to prevention and to respond to 
the concern that my own preventive regime falls prey to the same
difficulties I have raised about punishment of inchoate offenses.
A.  Is Punishment More Protective or Respectful? 
In his work, Slobogin argues that when punishment is applicable, we 
should opt first for punishment.67  Indeed, he views this as a “right” to be
67. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 45, at 124–29. 
 1291



























punished.68  Slobogin claims that to respect the autonomy of an actor, we 
must employ the criminal law when it is available, rather than branding 
an individual as dangerous in a way that is dehumanizing.69  Although
this requirement may be justified with respect to Slobogin’s view of 
preventive detention, which focuses on the undeterrability of the actor, it
has little purchase against my view, which is autonomy respecting. 
The question must be reframed as whether there is a requirement to 
punish when the alternative view also respects autonomy.  I do not see 
why.  Consider questions that prosecutors must ask when they decide
whether to prosecute a case.  Among these questions is whether a
civil remedy is available.  Prosecutors are told that a case that lies at the
border of contract law and criminal fraud should be dealt with as a civil 
matter if possible.  Now, we might ask where that should comes from.
Part of the rationale is expense—criminal cases are more costly.  Part of 
the concern is proportionality—it is often the case that the hard treatment
and stigma that come with a criminal conviction are, as a practical matter, 
too severe relative to the culpability involved.  Thus, if a case lies at the 
border, a civil remedy prevents the offender from being dealt with too 
harshly.  Whatever the reasons, it is simply not the case that there is a 
right to be punished that we enforce in our current practice, nor that such
a claim has any normative pull when analyzed against a background of
civil remedies and sanctions. 
Of course, the regime I propose is more criminal-like than a lawsuit by 
a government agency or private actor. There is the involvement of the 
state.  There may be a significant investment of resources.  And many of
the benefits that accrue from prosecutorial declinations will not obtain in 
these circumstances.  The point for now is that if my regime is autonomy
respecting, there is no reason to opt for punishment first.  And, indeed, 
we have never required the state to punish when other autonomy-respecting
civil remedies are also available. 
Another reason to endorse punishment over prevention is because the 
criminal law has well-worked-out procedural safeguards.  These rights 
include the right against self-incrimination, the requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to confront witnesses, and the like. 
That is, before the state can lock you up, it must produce persuasive proof
against you without your assistance.  Although some of these requirements
are questioned even within the context of the criminal law itself, there is
no reason in principle why they could not also apply to preventive 
interference.  That is, if we need these procedural safeguards, then so be
it.  We should have them. 
68. Id. at 125. 
69. See id.
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Along with procedural concerns, there are more general “legality”
concerns that might accompany choosing a civil regime.  Within this 
broad concept, we might include such concerns as wanting to constrain 
the state with an act requirement, notice and open publication, a ban on 
ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, and statutory interpretation in 
compliance with the rule of lenity.  Here, too, there is no reason in principle
why these requirements could not be applied.  Moreover, I think that 
these sorts of rules should—indeed, must—be applied because of the
way that my proposed system intersects with the criminal law.  That is, 
what is prohibited under my system is an intention to commit a crime.
Therefore, my regime should only pick out those individuals that currently
intend to do something against the law. 
In addition, the system I am proposing would be subject to its own 
constraints.  In his careful study comparing prevention with punishment, 
Andrew Ashworth reaches five tentative conclusions, including that 
[w]here a preventive measure does not amount to punishment but still involves
a significant loss of rights, especially where there is a deprivation of liberty, it
can only be justified if and insofar as the basis for prediction is sound and the 
principles of necessity, subsidiarity and proportionality are satisfied.70 
I concur with these restrictions.  That is, we should only preventively 
intervene if such intervention is necessary to stop the actor.  For instance, if
it turns out that the threat of criminal sanction is itself sufficient to deter
most car thieves, we should not use preventive interference mechanisms 
because most prospective criminals will change their minds before they 
complete the offense.  Additionally, the requirement of subsidiarity requires 
that the government use the least intrusive means possible.  So, if electronic 
monitoring and curfews are successful in preventing certain violent 
offenses, the state could not lock up the individual to prevent those 
crimes.  Finally, proportionality requires that we not blow a crime out of 
proportion.  There is a puzzle here that we see in self-defense as well.
Are we allowed to use deadly force to stop an aggressor who threatens
nondeadly force if that is the only way to stop the attacker?  May we 
lock up an individual permanently if that is the only way to stop the 
actor from committing a crime for which the penalty is, say, a maximum 
of seven years’ imprisonment?  Actors arguably remain liable for as long 
as they harbor the intention, and this certainly can exceed how much
 70. Andrew Ashworth, Punishment and Prevention: Some Distinctions, Relationships 
and Implications (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18). 
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punishment they might deserve.  My (admittedly tentative) conclusion is 
that the state should nevertheless be restricted to the maximum amount
of incarceration designated for the offense.  If nothing else, such an upper 
limit would restrict state abuse.  Certainly, in cases of terrorism and sexual
predators, there will still be cases where long-term prevention will be 
justifiable. 
B.  Does Prevention Present the Same Puzzles as          
Inchoate Criminality? 
Another question is why my preventive scheme is not hoisted upon
my own “antipunishment for inchoate crimes” petard.  That is, why do 
the same concerns about punishing fantasies, conditionality, renunciation,
and duration not counsel as much against prevention as they do
punishment?  In my view, these concerns actually support a prevention 
regime rather than undermine it. 
Let us consider renunciation and duration first.  The state has reason to
prevent an individual from acting for as long as, but not one minute 
longer than, the period in which the individual holds a criminal intention. 
Now, it is certainly the case that individuals who fluctuate in their 
intentions may ultimately be held for longer or shorter than is necessary
simply because we lack the epistemic and practical resources to determine
the exact moment when an intention is renounced or reaffirmed.  So, 
someone held might be subject to six months’ detention, although that
person abandoned the intention after four months.  Still, as a normative 
matter, fluctuations do directly impact liability.
Now, consider conditionality.  If an individual intends something that 
is not currently a crime—driving fifty miles per hour home—though the 
intention will hold in the face of inculpatory events—a horrible rainstorm as
she drives by a school—the individual has not currently chosen to risk 
harming others.  She may therefore be dangerous, or what Alexander and I
call an “anticipated culpable aggressor,” but she is not culpable now.  An 
individual who has a seemingly culpable intention—to harm Joe—that is 
actually externally conditional—unless Joe cries—and that she will abandon 
should not be punished as if she will follow through.  But for the moment, 
she does so intend to harm Joe, and the state is therefore rightly concerned 
with her.  The state thus has reason to get her to change her mind, and 
indeed, if it succeeds, then the individual’s intention was also externally
conditional on whatever it was that the state did! 
Prevention and punishment differ on who should bear the risk of error 
as to whether the actor will commit the offense.  Consider Albert, a 
culpable aggressor, who points a gun at Bridget and says, “I am going to 
kill you.”  Bridget cannot justify killing Albert because Albert deserves
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it.  After all, Albert may change his mind in just one minute, and if he 
did so before Bridget fired the gun, she certainly could not claim that
shooting him afterwards was punishment—nor could the state later 
execute him.  On the other hand, if Bridget shoots him before he changes 
his mind, she can rightly claim, “Look, it was by your voluntary act that 
I am in this position.  Sure, you may change your mind, but I cannot 
count on that.  You aim to harm me, and in so doing, you forfeit your 
right against my stopping you until the moment when you abandon that 
intention.  I am permitted to take you at your word.”  That is, in terms of
overinclusion, the risk of error is properly borne by the culpable
aggressor because in instances of prediction, there is always a risk of 
error.  Between a culpable aggressor and an innocent victim, it is fair to
place the risk of error on the culpable actor who initiated the situation in 
the first place. 
Finally, consider the concern about distinguishing intentions from
fantasies.  The act requirement I propose helps alleviate this concern 
because the difference between wanting one’s mother-in-law dead and
buying a gun is a rather clear line.  Although, as Walen suggests, some
individuals act out their fantasies,71 I am somewhat comfortable claiming 
that individuals who have this much control over their fantasies can be 
called to answer for them and to abandon them in the face of state 
intervention.  You get to have your dreams.  But you are not permitted to 
buy the gun and tell us you are only playing.
C.  Why Proportionality Favors Prevention 
The central reason to opt for a preventive regime is because what we
really want is prevention.  To put the point another way, if we opt for 
punishment and stay true to retributive principles that both Walen and I 
share, we simply cannot achieve enough within the realm of the criminal 
law.  That is, the deserved punishment will be exhausted before our
preventive desires are. 
How much punishment does a threat deserve?  Imagine that David 
forms the intention to kill Barbara tomorrow; he tells his friend Joe; and 
Joe tells the police.  How much punishment should David receive if all
he has done is formed the intention?  Ashworth and Zedner argue that 
“the sentence for a preparatory offence ought to be determined by reference 
71. See Walen, supra note 49, at 837. 
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to the crime intended by the offender, but then significantly discounted
by reference to the fact that only an early stage of preparation has been 
reached.”72 
The state’s interest in the defendant in the early stages is not 
retribution for wicked wrongdoers.  Indeed, in terms of investing resources, 
those who walk around with culpable intentions seem to be of little 
retributive concern to the state in comparison with other criminals and in 
comparison with nonretributive ways one could spend the government’s
money.  Recall the crime to Walen is that of “flouting the law.”  The 
reason why the state is interested in the defendants early on is because of
prevention.  The reason the state may want to intervene now is to prevent 
the crime later.  The state’s primary interest here is not the evil that has
been done but the evil that we predict the defendant might do.
Compare two actors, Ira and Paul.  Ira formed the intention to kill his 
victim.  Then he changed his mind.  Paul formed the intention to kill his 
victim, and the police stopped him.  He still has the intention.  In a world 
of limited resources, the state should care about Paul more than Ira.  Ira 
formed a culpable intention, and that was it.  Now, we do punish people 
for petty offenses, including stealing candy bars, and maybe the state
ought to invest as many resources in the Iras of the world as in the
candy-bar bandits.  But it seems clear that the state ought to be more
concerned with Paul not because of what he has done but because of 
what he might do.  Whatever punishment it is that Ira deserves for
flouting the law strikes me as insubstantial for precisely the reason we
should worry about punishing inchoate activity.  Ira has the ability to
change his mind and simply cause and risk no harm to anyone
whatsoever.  And Ira is aware of this revocability when he announces his 
first intention.  In contrast, the reason why the state should continue to 
care about Paul is precisely because he has not revoked his intention, 
and that makes him dangerous to us.
Indeed, a particularly telling example of just this phenomenon is 
Douglas Husak’s contribution to this issue, which takes exactly the
opposite approach, seeking to shift prevention into the criminal law.
Husak seeks to advance desert conditions that render someone
criminally liable, and likely, intending to commit a crime and taking an act 
in furtherance would meet Husak’s test.  But then Husak must grapple 
with proportionality.  Here, tellingly, he assimilates the dangerous
characteristic over which the actor has control, such as the possession
of an intention to the possession of an illegal weapon, and Husak states 
that people “remain deserving of punishment as long as they possess 
72. Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 7, at 286; see also Ohana, supra note 40, at 
25. 
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these properties. . . .  The desert base for their punishment is continuous; 
it survives as long as they exhibit the characteristics that predict future 
harm.”73 
However, the problem is that most possession offenses do not work 
quite the way Husak wants them to.  Assume that Steve steals a Picasso
from Jeremy and has it for five months.  Now, for the duration of the 
time that he has this Picasso he is harming Jeremy, and Steve deserves a
certain quantum of punishment—an amount that arguably increases over
time.  Indeed, even if Steve ultimately returns the Picasso—Steve was 
only using it to impress a girl—he still deserves punishment for the five 
months of possession, and this punishment can and will be imposed after
the crime is completed.  We certainly would not entertain Steve’s claim,
“But I don’t have it anymore,” as a reason to release him from jail.
Our preventive desires do not look quite like this.  If we want to detain
someone for just as long as that person harbors a criminal intention, 
then what we want is detention that is directly responsive to the current
existence of a threat, rather than a response that punishes ex post for 
having been a threat for a certain duration in the past.  Prevention, not 
punishment, is the regime that has the desired sensitivity to the actor’s 
current dangerousness. 
V. CONCLUSION
To be fair, one might say that Walen has a square peg he is trying to 
fit into a round hole, but the hole I offer for the square peg is actually 
triangular.  I wish to take a culpable action, subject it to hard treatment
and stigma, make the intervention last as long as prevention requires— 
subject perhaps to some upper limits—and call it prevention.  Walen
wishes to take a culpable action, intentionally subject it to hard treatment
and stigma, and claim that it deserves lengthy detention—to meet
preventive ends—and call it punishment.  To my mind, the label truly
should turn on what the state is primarily trying to do—to punish with
stigma and harsh treatment, or to detain to prevent harm.
Problems of criminalization and problems of preventive detention 
both need serious scrutiny and require sustained theoretical treatments.
Both practices are currently overinclusive and undertheorized.  So, 
whichever side theorists come out on, it is time for them to get to work. 
 73. Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1199 (2011). 
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